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SOME REALISM ABOUT EMPIRICISM
Carl Tobias"

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1983 revision to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure proved to be the most controversial amendment to the Federal
Rules since their adoption a half-century ago. In the years following the
revision's adoption, however, an absence of empirical data on the
Rule's application complicated assessment of its precise consequences.
The 1992 publication of The Use and Impact of Rule I I ("the article"),
by Lawrence Marshall, Herbert Kritzer, and Frances Kahn Zemans,
ameliorated this empirical deficiency.' The article set forth many important findings from the most comprehensive empirical study of Rule
11 ever performed. The study, conducted under the auspices of the
American Judicature Society (AJS), affords insights that implicate federal civil procedure, the Federal Rules revision process, and federal court
legal culture.2 The study's effect on the 1993 revision to Rule 11 warrants particular attention. The lessons derived from this recent revision
process will inform future efforts to revise Rule 11 and other Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Marshall-Kritzer-Zemans study, therefore, should be of compelling interest to a broad spectrum of individuals and entities that are
concerned about the federal courts. These include persons involved in
the courts' day-to-day activities, such as federal judges who apply the
Federal Rules and attorneys who must practice under the provisions.
The study should also be of value to individuals, such as students of
modem disputing and observers of the three-year process of Federal

* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Sally Johnson and Peggy
Sanner for their valuable suggestions; Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmenon for processing
this piece; and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain arc mine.
1. Lawrence C. Marshall et al., 171e Use and Impact of Rule II, 86 Nw. U. L REv. 943
(1992).
2. The article is a significant component of n larger study. The authors ha\'e discussed
some of the findings in the article elsewhere. See, e.g., Hcrben M. Kritzer ct al., Rule II:
Moi•ing Beyond tire Cosmic Anecdote, 15 JUDICATURE 269 (1992). See generally Marshall, s11pra
note I, at 943.
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Rules revlSlon, as well as institutions, such as the Judicial Conference
and the Rand Corporation, which evaluate the efficacy of federal court
procedures. 3 Finally, policymaking bodies, such as the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee), which evaluate the
rules and propose suggestions for their improvement, have relied on the
study's findings.
Because the Marshall-Kritzer-Zemans study has been quite significant and will probably continue to be influential, their article warrants
close analysis. This Essay is primarily a respectful critique, which emphasizes the authors' assertions regarding empirical data. The Essay
briefly describes the article and then assesses certain of its claims that
principally implicate empirical information.
II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ARTICLE

The article's introduction expresses concern about "dramatically
conflicting accounts" of the actual effects of Rule 11, as amended in
1983, on federal civil practice and about the failure of much academic
literature to address this problem.4 Because those responsible for rule
revision were at the time developing a proposal to modify Rule 11 and
needed systematic empirical data on which to premise decisionmaking,5
Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans found particularly significant the lack of
pertinent material on the rule's use and impact. The authors, accordingly, intended that their findings afford a "foundation for further scholarly
analysis in this area, as well as necessary information for those ...
considering Rule 11 reforms." 6
The authors initially explored the background of Rule 11 's 1983 amendment, examining certain purposes the rule revisers sought to achieve. 7

3. See, e.g., Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(c)(3), 104
Stat. 5089, 5096 (1990) (requiring Judicial Conference to "prepare a report on the plans developed and implemented by the Early Implementation District Courts" under the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990); id. § 105(c), 104 Stat. 5098 (requiring that study of ten pilot courts
implementing Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 be performed by "an independent organization
with expertise in the area of Federal court management").
4. Marshall, supra note I, at 943-44. The authors explained that the analysis of judicial
opinions-the mainstay of traditional legal scholarship-had not facilitated evaluation of Ruic 11
activity in the courtroom, much less outside of it. Id. at 944.
5. Id. at 944. The 1993 amendment of Rule 11 became effective on December l, 1993. See
Notice Concerning Amendments to Federal Rules, 151 F.R.D. 145 (1993); see also Supreme
Court of the United States, Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II, 146 F.R.D. 401,
419-24 (1993).
6. Marshall, supra note 1, at 946.
7. Id. at 946-49.
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The authors correctly concluded that the drafters meant to reduce litigation abuse by requiring lawyers to conduct reasonable legal and factual
inquiries before filing papers and by mandating that judges sanction
attorneys who violated the Rule. 8
The authors next explained the methodology of their study.9 The
study was conducted in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, thereby
affording geographical diversity and variability in the perceived incidence of Rule 11 activity. 10 The authors sought to guarantee variation
within the circuits by choosing several districts: one with a metropolitan
city; a second including middle-sized urban communities; and a third
having a predominantly non-urban population. 11 They asked 4,500 federal court litigators questions regarding their personal experiences with
Rule 11 and how the provision had affected their practices and conduct 12 The response rate was seventy-five percent, a figure considered
to be very high. 13
The authors examined the study's general findings concerning the
Rule's use. 14 They considered significant the frequency of formal Rule
11 activity, both in terms of the motions filed and the sanctions imposed.15 The authors determined that counsel for plaintiffs were the
target of Rule 11 activity much more frequently than defense attorneys.16 The authors concomitantly ascertained that there was considerable informal Rule 11 activity and that lawyers for plaintiffs were again
"far more likely to be the target." 17 The authors concluded that ninetyfive percent of the sanctions imposed were monetary but asserted that
this amount was smaller than "many media accounts of sensational

8. Id. at 947-48. See also FED. R. C1v. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983).
9. Marshall, supra note l, at 949-51.
10. Id. at 949-50; see also infra notes 30-34 and accompanying tcxl.
11. The districts surveyed within the Fifth Circuit included the Western District of Louisiana.
the Northern District of Mississippi, and the Southern District of Tcxas: the districts \\ithin the
Seventh Circuit included the Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of Indiana. and
the Western District of Wisconsin; the districts within the Ninth Circuit included the District of
Arizona, the District of Montana, the Eastern District of California. the Districl of Oregon. and
the Central District of California. Marshall, supra no1e l, at 950. The authors selected two
, additional districts in the Ninth Circuit "because of its unique size and di\·ersily." Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. This figure evidenced lawyers' keen in1ercs1 in Rule 11. Id. at 945.
14. Id. at 951-60.
15. Id. at 951-52. Fonnal activity includes proposals 10 sanction through counsel's motion or
a judge's show cause order. Id. at 951.
16. For example, counsel for plaintiffs were the target in 70 percent of the cases in which
courts imposed sanctions. Id. at 953.
17. Id. at 956.
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cases may lead some to imagine." 18
The authors also explored the Rule's impact on the practice of
law. 19 The greatest effect was on the amount of factual investigation
attorneys undertook before asserting claims or defenses. 20 Nearly twenty percent of the lawyers surveyed had refused to present a claim or
defense which they believed had merit out of concern about Rule 11.21
The authors correspondingly considered variables in the nature of the
case and practice.22 They determined that nearly twenty-three percent
of the suits in which courts levied sanctions involved civil rights, although those cases constituted only 11.4 percent of the actions filed. 23
The authors characterized as "surprising" the finding that judges imposed sanctions in an identical ratio for a different classification of
lawsuits labelled "other commercial cases," which involve, for example,
antitrust claims, corporations and banking law, and securities issues.24
Nonetheless, the authors described as "unique" the substantial discrepancy in the effect the Rule has had on the practices of counsel who represent civil rights plaintiffs and defendants. 25
The study explored numerous additional factors regarding attorneys'
practice environment and experience to ascertain their relevance. 26 Environmental considerations, including law firm size, community size,
and district size, seemed to have little effect.27 As to experiential factors, the authors concluded that attorneys with prior Rule 11 experience
were more likely to have modified their conduct.28
The authors also evaluated variations in the Rule's employment and
effects in the three circuits surveyed.29 The results were consistent
with the reputations of the circuits: the Seventh Circuit was found to be
the most aggressive enforcer; the Ninth Circuit was the most lenient;

18. Id. at 956-57. The median sanction was $2,500. Id. at 957.
19. l<i. at 960-65.
20. Id. at 960, 964.
21. Id. at 961. Sixty and sixth-tenths percent of the respondents had taken some important
action during the prior year in response to Rule 11. I<i. at 961.
22. Id. at 965-75.
23. Id. at 965-66.
24. Id. at 966-67. The authors posited several explanations for this finding, none of which
they seemed to consider satisfactory. See id. at 966-68.
25. Id. at 971-75. "(C]ivil rights defense lawyers appear to be disproportionately unaffected
by Rule 11." l<i. at 971.
26. Id. at 975-80.
27. Id. at 975-79.
28. Id. at 980.
29. Id. at 981-85.
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and the Fifth Circuit occupied the middle ground.30 The incidence of
cases in which courts imposed sanctions was considerably higher in the
Seventh Circuit.31 Nonetheless, lawyers in the Fifth Circuit were most
responsive to Rule 11,32 although the authors ultimately found "no
dispositive explanation for the high level of reaction."33
The article concludes with several general propositions that the
authors deemed worthy of repetition. 34 Even though the authors ascertained that plaintiffs had been the targets of Rule 11 activity considerably more often than defendants, lawyers who typically represent either
plaintiffs or defendants responded similarly to the Rule, with the significant exception of civil rights attomeys.3s Moreover, the authors found
that the experiences of those polled strongly suggested that much of the
portrayal of the impact of Rule 11 was "significantly skewed."36 The
authors did not purport to resolve the ultimate normative issue of
whether the 1983 Rule's benefits had outweighed its disadvantages but
asserted that the study had afforded systematic evidence regarding the
reality of the provision in operation.37 The article closes by importuning decisionmakers and scholars to premise their judgments about
Rule H's imminent revision on "evidence-not conjecture or anecdotes-about" the Rule's employment and effects, because policymaking
that was not based on empirical reality would be ineffective and produce unintended consequences.38
Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans made a substantial contribution. They
carefully collected, analyzed and synthesized an enormous quantity of
invaluable empirical data on Rule 11 's use and impact. It is difficult to
overstate the importance of the type of endeavor they undertook. The
development of questionnaires, their circulation, the compilation of
responses, the interpretation of statistical information, and the derivation
of conclusions from that data are relatively unglamorous and onerous

30. Id. at 981.
31. Courts in the Seventh Circuit imposed sanctions in 24.5% of the cases as compared with
courts in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that did so in 14.6C:O and 14.4% n:sp:clivcly. Id.
32. Id. at 982.
33. Id. at 985.
34. Id. at 985-86.
35. The other general ideas are thal geographic selling is strikingly importanl to Ruic 11
activity and that more than 80% of the respondents stated that the Ruic had affected their practices. Id. at 985.
36. Id. For example, the authors stated tha1 lawyers devote linlc time to Ruic 11. that
sanctions' imposition has been limited. and that mos1 sanctions arc modest. Id.
37. Id. at 985-86.
38. Id. at 986.
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tasks, yet they are vital. The authors' efforts elevated the level of debate over Rule 11, a debate that had generated more heat than light.
There was a compelling need for the type of "real world" data on
Rule 11 gathered by the authors. Although much can be learned from
the collection of empirical evidence on Rule 11 's formal invocation, the
overwhelming majority of Rule 11 activity since 1983 has been informal. Empirical data on the Rule's informal use was, therefore, critical
to the work of public policymakers, such as the Advisory Committee
on the Civil Rules, in formulating the most effective proposal to amend
the Rule. Much of the Rule 11 activity that had been most controversial, such as informal threats to invoke Rule 11 against civil rights
plaintiffs, could have chilled civil rights plaintiffs' enthusiasm. The
authors reported, for example, that Rule 11 had led civil rights attorneys to advise clients not to pursue potentially meritorious claims and
even forego suit.39
In short, Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans compiled, evaluated and
synthesized a wealth of essential information on the employment and
effects of the 1983 amendment of Rule 11. This material yielded informative insights which implicated propositions principally related to the
theory and practice of, and institutions involved in, Federal Rules revision. Several of the issues raised by their study warrant additional consideration. The following section briefly attempts to explore one of the
most important issues and to show how it was addressed in the most
recent Federal Rules amendment process.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE

As stated above, very little empirical data on the impact of Rule 11
had been assembled before Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans published
their study. There was, accordingly, a compelling need for the type of
experiential data provided by the authors. There was also a need to
interpret and analyze the empirical information collected, so that public
policymakers could transform the data into effective proposals for rule
revision. Unfortunately, the authors drew comparatively few conclusions
from much of the data they reported. Moreover, the material on which
the authors premised the conclusions that they did reach is open to
varying interpretation. Furthermore, the authors seemed to understate the
significance of certain information they gathered, leaving readers with
the impression that important inferences should not be derived from

39. Id. at 973.
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some of the data.
The civil rights area is illustrative. Considerable raw data that Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans assembled lent empirical support to the
informal observations of numerous judges and writers that the 1983
Rule had disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs.40 The authors, however,
did not so state and seemed to draw different conclusions from certain
relevant information. For example, the authors found that courts imposed monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 even more often (ninetyfive percent of the cases) than was believed but asserted that the
amount of the sanctions was apparently much lower than many had
assumed. 41 The authors characterized as "relatively modest [the]
amount of money involved in the majority of sanctions cases" and
noted that the median sanction was $2,500. They remarked that the
"bar's reaction to Rule 11 ha[d] been fueled by the horror stories of the
extremely unusual sanctions that exceed $1,000,000."42 I would suggest, although the authors did not, that significant inferences for civil
rights plaintiffs can be derived from these statements and the information on which they are premised. For instance, a single parent. who
believes that she has suffered employment discrimination and pursues
litigation to vindicate substantive rights to be free from discrimination,
will not consider modest a $2,500 sanction.
Judicial imposition of substantial sanctions on Julius Chambers,
Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and William
Kunstler, the renowned civil rights attorney, in separate civil rights
cases,43 also chilled civil rights lawyers who were understandably concerned when courts penalized the ablest among them.44 Shockwaves
have reverberated as well through the public interest law community

40. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1086 {7th Cir. 1987J
(Cudahy, J., dissenting), cen. dismissed, 48S U.S. 90 (1988); Carl Tobias. Rule 11 and Civil
Rights litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 48S (1988·89). See generally Erle K. Yamamoto,
Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Couns for Minorities, 2S HARV. C.R.·C.L L
REv. 341 (1990).
41. Marshall, supra note l, at 946.
42. Id. at 9S7.
43. See Blue v. United States Dep't of the Anny, 914 F.2d S2S (4th Cir. 1990). cen. de·
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1S80 (1991); ln re Kunstler, 914 F.2d SOS (4th Cir. 1990), cen. denied, Ill
s. Ct. 1607 (1991).
44. See, e.g., Melissa L Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule I I-Some "Chilling" Prob- /ems in the Struggle BeMeen Compensation and Punishment. 14 GEO. LI. 1313, 1327, 1340
(1986); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988); Stephen Labaton, Solution to Wasteful Lawsuits Becomes a Problem, N.Y. n.~tES, June 14. 1992. at
E2.
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since 1989 when a judge levied a $1,000,000 sanction on public interest litigants.45
The experience with Rule 11 's impact on civil rights plaintiffs,
accordingly, demonstrates that empirical data alone, even once interpreted, will not suffice to support the public policy determinations that are
so critical to the revision of a controversial rule of civil procedure.
Some considerations important to efficacious decisionmaking cannot be
empirically measured. Certain factors may resist quantification or verification. Others will require value judgments. It is legitimate and indeed
imperative to consult, integrate, and apply additional relevant sources in
formulating the best public policy decisions on rule revision. The most
pertinent inquiry becomes ascertaining which sources are appropriate.
As to these propositions, the efforts to develop an effective proposal
that led to Rule 11 's amendment are highly instructive.46 The Advisory Committee first commissioned the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to
conduct a comprehensive Rule 11 study, which was similar to that
performed by Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans. The committee also issued
a call for comment, soliciting public input on the Rule's possible revision.47 The committee diligently reviewed the FJC's findings and the
public's suggestions. The panel circulated a preliminary draft proposal
for public comment;48 received written and oral public input; and significantly revised this draft during May 1991.
In June 1992, the Advisory Committee presented a new proposal to
the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
which adopted most of the Advisory Committee's recommendations,
with the important exception of leaving to judicial discretion the imposition of sanctions.49 Many features included in that proposal, which
45. See Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1989), ajf'd, 932 F.2d 1572
(11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992).
46. In this paragraph I rely substantially on Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. Ml·
AMI L. REV. 855, 858-97 (1992) [hereinafter Reconsidering] and on Carl Tobias, Civil Rights
Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11. 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775 (1992) [hereinafter
Proposed]. These sources include citations to all of the relevant primary sources, a few of
which I include here.
47. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITIEB
ON CIVIL RULES OF TIIE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991) [hereinafter FJC
REPORT]; Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro·
cedure, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990). This was important, as the Committee inverted the
normal sequence of initially developing a proposal and then seeking public comment.
48. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 137
F.R.D. 53, 74-82 (1991). See generally Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 865-97.
49. See Randall Sambom, Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule 11, NAT'L LJ., July 6, 1992. at 13.
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eventually became the amended Federal Rule 11. are solicitous of the
needs of civil rights plaintiffs. The Federal Rule amendment, therefore,
substantially improved the 1983 Rule and was considerably better than
the May 1991 draft.so
Most relevant was the apparent willingness of both committees to
consult, integrate, and apply information from sources other than empirical data. Each committee, of course, relied substantially on the material generated by the FJC and Marshall-Kritzer-Zemans studies. Had the
committees depended exclusively or even primarily on this information,
however, they would not have adopted proposals which appear so solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs. For instance, neither the FJC study nor
the Marshall-Kritzer-Zemans article left the impression that Rule 11 had
substantially disadvantaged, much less disproportionately affected, civil
rights plaintiffs.s 1 Rather than rely solely on the empirical studies, the
two committees participated in the type of rule revision process that
Congress expressly prescribed in the Judicial Improvements and Access
to Justice Act of 1988.s2 They carefully drafted proposals, sought and
seriously considered public comment, modified the drafts in light of
that input, and hammered out workable proposals in the crucible of
public debate. The committees listened closely to all segments of the
organized bar: plaintiffs, defense, civil rights, and public interest, as
well as corporations, government representatives, and the public.
Members of both committees apparently found that empirical information alone was insufficient and therefore consulted additional sources.
More specifically, they seemingly heard the "Call of Stories" involving
Rule 11.53 Many of these incidents were neither reported in the advance sheets nor retrievable on computerized services. However, a numIn September, the Judicial Conference approved without change the proposal fonnulared in June.
In April 1993, the Supreme Court transmined to Congress the amendment of Federal Rule 11
which became effective on December I, 1993. See supro note 5. Bills that would have postponed the amendment's effective date for one year were introduced. but the legislation did not
pass. See S. 1382, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2979, 103d Cong., 1st Scss. (1993).
SO. See generally Proposed, supra note 46; Reconsidering, supro nore 46.
51. See, e.g., FJC REPoRT, supra nole 47, §§ IA-IC; Marshall, supra nole I, al 946, 957;
see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying texL Biii see Marshall, supm note I. al 973;
supra notes 23-25 and accompanying texL
52. Pua. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (codified al 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-78 (1988}). See
generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope 01·er Experience: Mandatory /nfonnol Discoi·ery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795. 854 (1991).
53. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 19 CAL. L REv. 971 (1991): see also
Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, 26 GA. L REv. 901 (1992) (the story of In re Kunstler):
cf. Kritzer, supra note 2 (characterizing much Rule 11 debate as consisting of cosmic anecdotes). See generally Symposium on Legal Storytelling. 87 MICH. L REv. 2073 (1989).
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ber of these cases were reported or were available on computerized
services, and a few of them were sensational, especially in terms of the
size of the sanctions levied. 54 Perhaps the rule revisers understood that
data regarding some of this Rule 11 activity was notoriously difficult to
collect, evaluate, and synthesize; that chilling effects were not reducible
to precise empirical validation; and that the Rule's impact on civil
rights plaintiffs may have been obscured by the way that certain empirical information was presented.5s They might also have appreciated that
a modest sanction could bankrupt impecunious litigants or that news
travels fast in the public interest law and civil rights communities,
particularly when judges impose large sanctions on their foremost advocates.56
Indeed, a telling moment in the rule revision process came during
the May 1991 meeting at which the Advisory Committee crafted its
preliminary draft proposal. 57 One lengthy discussion in which most
committee members participated indicated that they believed the perception that Rule 11 was chilling civil rights plaintiffs was sufficient to
warrant possible amendment, even if that fact could not be empirically
verified. This decision was appropriate, given congressional intent clearly expressed in many civil rights statutes that the judiciary facilitate
plaintiffs' vindication of their substantive rights.ss
I am neither criticizing the outstanding contribution made by Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans nor denigrating the value of empirical data.
Both are immensely important. I do believe, however, that the material
assembled must be interpreted to inform public policy choices that are
ultimately made. Concomitantly, the significance of certain findings,
such as the meaning for civil rights plaintiffs of even a few substantial
sanctions or a larger number of modest ones, should not be under-

54. See supra notes 43 & 45 and accompanying text.
55. For example, reliance on the median, rather than the mean. sanctioning amounts can
understate the importance for civil rights plaintiffs of even a small number of large sanctions.
See Marshall, supra note I. at 957: see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; infra
note 59 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 43 & 45 and accompanying text.
57. I rely substantially in this paragraph on notes that I took while attending the Advisory
Committee meeting. See generally Reconsidering, supra note 46, at 857 n.2.
58. See, e.g.. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pue. L. No. 102-166. 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (Supp. IV 1992). See generally Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Subs/Clnce
in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substamive and Procetlural Law in Title VII
Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH.
U. L.Q. 801 (1992).
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stated.59
There must be more and better infonnation and increased and refined analysis of all sorts that will improve important public
policymaking. We need systematically collected empirical data, but we
also must hear the Call of Stories. Researchers might even closely
analyze case files in high profile civil rights cases or interview the
lawyers, litigants, and judges involved in those suits.60 Decisionmakers
must listen to all interests affected by rule revision and draft changes
that are as responsive as possible to those interests while remembering
congressional intent expressed in substantive statutes, such as civil
rights legislation.

N.

CONCLUSION

Marshall, Kritzer, and Zemans significantly advanced the highly
controversial debate over the 1983 amendment of Federal Rule 11.
Public policymakers properly relied on the valuable empirical data that
the authors collected, analyzed, and synthesized. They were also correct
to consult, evaluate, and integrate relevant material apart from empirical
information that could be found in other sources, such as stories involving the imposition of significant Rule 11 sanctions in civil rights cases.
When decisionmakers consider and apply all of this available material,
they are able to formulate the most efficacious proposals for rule revision.

59. See supra notes 43-45, 53-56 and accompanying texL
60. The Center for Constitutional Rights proposed to undertake such a study but discontinued
this effort once the Call for Comments issued. See Tobias, supra note 40, at 525 n.151.

